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IN THE SUPREME CO·UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. vVILLIAM RANDALL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Civil No.

TRACY COLLINS TRUST COMPANY,
Executor of the Estate of SARAH P.
RANDALL BRERETON, Deceased,
Defendant and Appellant.

8430

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal taken by Tracy Collins Trust Company as Executor of the Estate of Sarah P. Randall
Brereton, deceased, from a J udg1nent and Decree entered
by the Honorable vVilliam Stanley Dunford, Judge of
the District Court of Utah County, on the 6th day of
July, 1955, and from the order of the Court denying
Appellant's J\fotion for a new Trial dated September 8th,
1955.
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The action w.as originally comin_enced by Respondent on October 29, 1954, claiming that at some time
between April 1, 1946 and September 1, 1946 Sarah P.
Randall Brereton, now deceased, "proposed to Plaintiff that if he would leave his business in Ogden, Utah,
dispose of his home and move his family to Provo, and
become an employee of the State B.ank of Provo, of
which deceased owned stock control, and devote his time
and attention to the personal and financial affairs of
deceased and to her welfare, during the remainder of
her lifetime, she would, in consideration of such acts
and services on the p.art of Plaintiff, leave to him by
Last Will and Testament all her stock in the said State
Bank of Provo which she should own at the time of
her death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah."
The Complaint further alleges that Plaintiff agreed
with decedent that he would undertake and perforn1 such
obligation and services; that he did so; and that notwithstanding the decedent did, pursuant to said agreernent, leave Plaintiff said bank stock and residence, said
decedent thereafter on or about October :23. 1951 in
violation of said contract "perfonned and being performed hy Plaintiff" changed her \Yill and left s.aid
bank stock to one Ross Richards.
The answer of the Defendant set up the defense that
the complaint failed to state a clailn upon which relief
could be granted and in any event denied the existence
of any agremnent or that Plaintiff had perforn1ed any
agree1nent entitling hin1 to recover. Defendant further
pleaded the Statute of ":"ills and the Statute of Frauds.
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The Court never fonnally ruled upon the defense that
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
Upon request of the Plaintiff, .and over objection
of the Defendant, the Court set the cause down for
jury trial, stating that "there see1ns to be so n1uch of
fact involved in the presentation and disproof of the
claimed agreement and the compliance or noncompliance
therewith that it felt the jury could give the Court considerable assistance." (R.p. 36) (Reference is made to
this matter specifically for the reason that it evidences
the apparent attitude of the Court throughout this case
that the actual burden was upon the Defendant to disprove the existance of the agreement rather than upon
the Plaintiff to prove the existance thereof).
The decedent Sarah P. Randall Brereton, w.as 95
years old at the time of her death on June 4, 1954.
She, and her husband before her, had been the chief
stockholder and directing officer of the State Bank of
Provo. :Mr. Brereton died in November, 1938, and there.,.
after Mrs. Brereton took an active part in the administration of the affairs of the bank until a short time
prior to her death.
Apparently the first Will which Mrs. Brereton executed was shortly after her husband's death. On April
22, 1940 she executed a Will which, after providing for
various specific bequests, willed to Plaintiff J. William
Randall, Ross Richards, and Tracy Collins Trust Company as Trustees, 126 shares of the c.apital stock of the
State Bank of Provo with authority vested in said
3
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Trustees to vote during the term of the trust. The
trust was to continue for a period of ten ( 10) years
following Mrs. Brereton's death, or until the death of
the Plaintiff, J. Willaim Randall, or until the stock was
sold by the Trustees, whichever event occured first. The
income from the stock, under the terms of the trust,
was to be paid to the Plaintiff during the period of
the trust. Upon the expiration of ten (10) years, or
upon the sale of the stock by the Trustees, the rest of
the trust was to become the property of J.Ir. Randall
absolute. But if Plaintiff died during the trust, then
the property was to be sold and the proceeds distributed
to his children, share and share alike.
The will further had a residuary clause hy which all
of the "rest and residue" of decedent's property "\Vas to
go to the Plaintiff, "outright and absolute", or to his
children in the event Plaintiff did not survive the
testator.
This Will re1nained in effect without change until
June 24, 1941, when testatrix executed a codicil which
changed some of the specific bequeaths. Again, on October 21, 1941, Mrs. Brereton made a second codicil which,
among other things, changed the provision of the \Yill
with respect to Plaintiff's participation therein by providing that in the event Plaintiff died prior to testatrix,
or during the existance of the trust, the bank stock
would be divided anwng 1-! nmued relatives, incluing
Ross Richards. On l\Iay 7, 19-!6, :Mrs. Brereton executed
a third codicil in which she cancelled .all provisions
relating to the trust and any benefits to be derived
4
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therefron1 in favor of the Plaintiff and his heirs. The
effect of this change was to throw the bank stock into the
residuary clause of the \Yill which remained unchanged
and which bequeathed .all the rest and residue of said
property to the Plaintiff.
In the fall of 1946, the Plaintiff, J. William Randall,
left Ogden, Utah and went to Provo where he began to
work full time in the bank. Prior to that time, and
from about 1940 on, :Mr. Randall had been a director
in the bank and participated in the directors' meetings.
When he first came down in 1946, he becmne what ht·
termed hin1self as "Active Vice-President," although he
had been Vice-President for son1e ti1ne prior thereto.
(Tr. 102). Later in 1946, he bought a home in Provo and
subsequently 1noved his family down, and they have since
lived in Provo.
Mrs. Brereton's Will remained unchanged from May
7, 1946, until October 23, 1951 when she executed her
fourth codicil by which she specifically left to Plaintiff her h01ne, furniture, fixtures, and equip1nent, and
changed the residuary clause therein so as to make Ros~
Richards her legatee. She died on June 4, 1954, approximately two years and nine months later without further
change in the Will.
Upon the Will being admitted to probate, Plaintiff herein commenced this action alleging an oral agreement between the Decedent and the Plaintiff as above set
forth and requesting the Court to require the Tracy
Collins Trust Company .as Executor of the Will specifi-cally to perform such oral agreement. Plaintiff also filed
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

objections to the admitting of the Will to probate, contesting the fourth codicil upon the grounds .and for the
reasons that the decedent "was continuously not of sound
and disposing mind because of decedent's advanced .age,
and that said decedent was therefore incapable, because
of unsoundness of mind, of making a codicil to her Last
\Vill and Testament." Plaintiff further alleged that the
beneficiary to said fourth codicil, Ross Richards, controlled and influenced the mind and action of decedent
"to the extent that the said Ross Richards did succeed
in substituting his will for the will of said decedent,
and that at the time of the execution of the document
dated October 23, 1951, purporting to be a fourth codicil
to her Last \Vill and Testament, decedent was not following the dictates of her own will, but was acting
wholly under the influence of said Ross Richards and
that said purported fourth codicil was not the free and
voluntary .act of decedent, but it was solely the result
of the undue influence of said Ross Richards." (See,
Probate File No. 10915, adn1itted in evidence).
The Will contest action is now pending in the
District Court and has not yet been heard. (The very
fact that Plaintiff herein has filed an action attempting
to set aside the last codicil of decedenfs \Viii indicates
the weakness of his position in this action, purporting
to elailn a verbal agree1nent between hin1 and the decedent, whereby decedent allegedly agreed to leave Plaintiff her property.)
The Trial Court held a pre-trial at which two issues
of fact wen• fr.mned for detenuination as follows:
6
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"1. On or about the last of April, 1946, did
decedent and the Plaintiff enter into an agreement whereby the decedent agreed that in consideration of Plaintiffs leaving his business in
Ogden, selling his home and moving his family to
Provo and becoming an employee of the State
Bank of Provo, in which bank decedent owned the
controlling interest, .and would thereafter devote
his time and attention to the personal and financial affairs of decedent and her welfare during the
remainder of her lifetime, that she would leave
to him by her Last Will and Testament all of
her stock in said State Bank of Provo, constituting a controlling interest therein, and the home
which she then owned, being the property
described in paragraph 3 of the Plaintiff's complaint~

"2. If so, has the agreement been performed
by the Plaintiff f'
In addition to the above issues of fact the Court
framed three issues of law as follows:
"1. If any .agreement, as claimed by Plaintiff, was made, was such agreement in violation
of the Statute of Frauds 1

"2. If any agreement, as claimed by Plaintiff, was made, was such agreement in violation of
the Statute of Wills?
"3. If .any agreement, as claimed by Plaintiff, was made, was legal consideration given for
the agreement?"
Over the objection of the Defendant, the Court
placed the matter on the jury calendar for trial, which
commenced on }farch 21, 1955. Following the conclusion
of the evidence the n1atter was submitted to the jury
7
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upon special interrogatories which were found in favor
of the Plaintiff .and against the Defendant. Thereafter
the court set the matter down for argu1nent by counsel,
which argument was held in June, 1955. Subsequently
the Court on the 24th of June rendered a memorandum
decision in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. On July 6th Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment were filed; and thereafter on July 14th
defendant filed .a motion to amend the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and also filed a motion for New
Trial. After hearing the arguments of counsel on the
foregoing 1natters the Court on September 8, 1955, modified its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
having so n1odified the Findings denied Defendant's
motion to mnend and for a New Trial. Thereafter, within
the ti1ne required, the Defendant took this appeal.
STA_TE1IEXT OF POIXTS
Appellant relies upon the following propositions for
reversal of the Judgment of the Trial Court:
1. The pleadings are insufficient to set forth any
right to relief by way of specific perfonnance.

2. The evidence is insufficient to justify any
Finding that an Agree1nent existed.
3. The evidence is insufficient to show that the
Plaintiff fulfilled the tern1s of any purported ~'-greeinent.
The evidence conclusively shows that Plaintiff
could be, and was, con1pensated fully for any services
rendered by hiln for decedent.
.f.

8
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5. The Court erred in refusing to allow the introduction of evidence relating to Plaintiff's income before
and after he cmne to Provo and began working at the
Bank.
6. The Court erred in adrnitting testimony of the
witness, Clyde Sandgren, who was decedent's .attorney,
of conversations between hi1nself and decedent.
7. The Court erred in submitting the n1atter to tlw
jury and in its instructions on the effect to be given
to the evidence by the jury.
8. The trial court erred 111 following the verdict
of the jury and in entering Judgment in favor of th~.:~
Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
For convenience of the Supreme Court in reviewin~
the case, the foregoing points have been consolidated
into the following propositions for discussion and argument in the Brief:
POINT I
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DECEDENT AND PLAINTIFF.
POINT II
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE REQUIRE THE
FINDING THAT ANY SUCH PURPORTED AGREEMENT
WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND UNENFORCEABLE.
9
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN RULINGS ON THE
EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE MATTER
TO THE JURY AND IN FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION
OF THE FACTS.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DECEDENT AND PLAINTIFF.

At the outset we wish to point out that this being
an equity case, this Court will review all of the facts
to determine if there is substantial evidence to support
the decision of the lower Court. Lake Shore Duck Club
v. Lake View D1.tck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309. There
this Court said that in an equity case the court would
"review the testilnony for the purpose of detennining
what the facts are and the equities of the parties, even
though its views are in conflict with the findings of
the trial court."
The basis of Plaintiff's cl.ain1 is set out in paragraph
2 of the Complaint to the effect that Decedent ""proposed
to Plaintiff that if he would leaye his businesf' in Ogden,
Utah, dispose of his hmue and 1uove with his fa1nily to
Provo, and becmne an e1nployee of State Bank of Provo,
of which deceased owned stock control, and devote his
time and attention to the personal .and financial affairs

10
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of deceased and to her welfare, during the remainder
of her lifetilne, she would, in consideration of such acts
and services on the part of Plaintiff, leave to him by
Last "'\Vill and Testarnent all her stock in the said State
B.ank of Provo which she should own at the time of
her death, together with her residence in Provo, Utah;
Plaintiff agreed with Decedent that he would undertake
and perform such obligations and services, and shortly
thereafter, and as expeditiously as possible, sold his
Ogden horne and moved to Provo, and during the remainder of the lifetirne of Decedent, cared for her aw{
her .affairs, both personal and financial and became and
continued an mnployee of said State Bank of Provo.
(R. p. 4)
In its arnended Findings the Court found:

"1. That between April 1 and September
1, 1946, Plaintiff and Sarah P. Randall Brereton
entered into an oral agreement by the terms of
which the said Sarah P. Randall agreed that if
Plaintiff would sell his home and leave his business in Ogden, Utah, move with his family to
Provo, Utah, become an employee of the State
Bank of Provo and would devote his time, talents,
energy and attention during her lifetime to caring
for her business and financial affairs, particularly her bank, giving advice and counsel in
respect to other matters and caring for her personal affairs such as rendering her personal services, care and :attention, caring for her home,
furnishing her companionship, meals, protection
during illness and the maintenance of her home
and grounds in an efficient operating condition,
that upon her death she would leave to him by
her Will her home in Provo and her stock con11
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stituting controlling interest in the State Bank of
Provo." (R. 60-62)
The findings go beyond what is clailned in the
Complaint in .an attempt to set out a sufficient agreeInent to justify the Court in ordering its performance.
Yet, as will be seen hereinafter, there is no testimony
in the record that in any way would indicate that Plaintiff rendered decedent "personal services, care and attention, caring for her home, furnishing her companionship,
1neals, protection during illness," because of any contractual obligation. Certainly the 1nere fact that some
such services were rendered is no evidence of a contract
to perform then1.
In the beginning, the cmnplaint does not set out,
as a part of the alleged agreen1ent between Plaintiff
and Decedent, .any specific acts ·which the Plaintiff was
to perform except to 1nove from Ogden, Utah, to Provo,
to become an employee of the bank, and devote his
time and attention to the personal and financial affair~
of deceased and to her welfare. Obviously it would be
in1possible for Plaintiff to undertake einployJ.nent .at
Provo, Utah at the bank unless he sold his hmne in
Ogden and 1noved to Provo. Likewise, since :Jirs.
Brereton's financial inten·~ts were tied up with the
hank, the attention the Plaintiff n1ight giYc to the bank
affairs would, in all probability, inure to the benefit of
~Irs. Brereton financially-at least if such actiYitie~
were profitable. However, the cmnplaint in no 'vay
claims any purported agremnent whereby Plaintiff wa~
to render to the decedent personal ~eJTice, care and
attention, caring for her honw, furnishing her cmnpany,

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

111eals, protection during illness and the maintenance of
her home and grounds in an efficient operating condition. Yet that is what the court found was the Agreelnent in its an1ended Findings set forth above. The only
allegation in the complaint relating to an agree1nent
was that such .agreement related to personal and financial affairs.
Insofar a:-> the evidence is concerned, there is very
little, if any, competent and 1naterial testin1ony that
any agreement at all was made between the parties.
The witness l\1:ildred Brereton, a niece of the decedent
testified over the objection of counsel for Defendant,
that in the spring of 1939, decedent told the witness
that if the latter would live with decedent and take care
of her during the re1nainder of her life, decedent would
give the witness what property she had. (Tr. 13)
Although the foregoing is so remote in time that counsel
objected to it on the grounds that it was both ilnmaterial
and irrelevant, it further does not in any way tend to
establish any agreement between decedent and the Plaintiff herein. As a matter of fact, the proposition if made
by decedent to the witness, appears to have required
the witness to stay with decedent and take care of her.
There is no claim by Plaintiff that he stayed with
decedent or that he personally took care of her, the
evidence being that decedent had a special housekeeper
or nurse during her declining years. (Tr. 32,33)
Subsequently, in the fall of 1939, the witness testified that decedent asked to be driven to Ogden to see
the Plaintiff stating that she was "going up to see

13
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if she could make any arrangements to get \Yill Randall
to come down and take over her personal and business
affairs. She said she needed someone she could trust
and who had the ability and understood the banking
and lumber business." (Tr. 16)
Again, if this testimony is 1naterial for any purpose
it relates only to a business relationship to be established
between the parties and not to any relationship involving
fili.al service, affection, compaionship, or association.
Even the final conclusion of the witness' testimony to
the effect that when she was advised by decedent that
~fr. Randall was coming to Provo decedent said, "she
had worked out an agree1nent with \Viii whereby he
would come down and take over the bank" ; and also
that "he w.as to take over her personal affairs and also
at that time the lumber yard," (Tr. 22) involves nothing
more than a business relationship for assistance to decedent in managing her financial matters. Counsel for the
Plaintiff indulged in considerable leading and suggestive
questions which were objected to; but even his questions
did not suggest any agree1nent of personal coinpanionship, care, affection and association. I quote fron1 the
Transcript, pages 22, 23 as follows:
"Q. (Continuing) I asked you if she said
what Will was to get in return for the duties he
was to perform for her and at the bank?
"A. She said he was to get the hank stock
and her home."
Other witnesses relied upon by Plaintiff to show
an agree1nent were l\fr. :Money and :\Ir. Charles Dickson,

14
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who were banker friends of the Plaintiff, residing in
Spanish Fork, Utah. They testified they had been interested in acquiring decedent's stock in the State Bank
of Provo. Mr. ~Ioney testified that Mrs. Brereton "made
the statement that she had turned her interest over to
Will Randall, and that he was coming down to take
care of her banking interest and also her." (Tr. 39).
On redirect exan1ination, and upon a leading question
being asked by Plaintiff's counsel, the witness testified,
"She gave us to understand very definitely that she
had made a deal with Randall and turned her interests
over to hi1n and he was coming down to operate her
interests." (Tr. 40)
Mr. Dickson's testimony was to the affect that
decedent stated "that Will was coming down to take over
her interests in the hank, that a deal had been made
with him for that purpose."

"Q. Did she say what Will was supposed
to

do~"

"A. No, I don't know that she detailed his
duties, but she said that he was coming down;
a deal had been made with him; that she wasn't
interested in selling her bank stock; that .a deal
had been made with him and that she wasn't
interested in selling." (Tr. 43)
On cross-examination :Mr. Dickson could not tell
when the purported conversation took place, nor as to
any more details thereof.
The testimony of Mr. Money and Mr. Dickson might
well be read in the light of the testimony of Clyde

15
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Sandgren, an attorney. ~Ir. Sandgren's testimony was
objected to as being privileged, and that 1natter will be
discussed hereinafter. However, even conceding for the
moment that his testimony was properly admitted, it
shows only an intention to give to Plaintiff sufficient
stock to control the bank-not in consideration of personal services to be performed, but by way of an inducement to get him to come to Provo and look after her
interests at the bank. ~fr. Sandgren testified:
"Q. Would you state what she said to you
with respect to her agreement with Will Randall~

"A. She said that she had asked :\Ir. Randall
to come to Provo to look after her interests at
the bank, and as an inducement, had promised to
leave him the controlling interest in the bank,
through her will. She stated she had directed that
126 shares out of the 150 owned by her be given
to Mr. Randall.
it~

"Q.

That is the substance of

"A.

That is the substance of it." (Tr. 81)

In response to further interrogation by Plaintiff's
counsel as to what if any personal sen-ices :\Lr. Randall
\Yas to perfor1n, the witness testified:
"Q. Did she say anything to you about what
Mr. Randall had done for her personally, or anything of that sort!

"A.

No, she did not." (Tr. 81)

On cross exmnination ::\Ir. SandgrPn indentified
Exhibit A, which was rt'ePiYed in evidence, as a letter
decedent had requested ~lr. Sandgren to prepare and
send to rl 1 raey-Collins Trust Cmnpany in connection with

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

her Will, which .at that time left to the Plaintiff all of
her bank stock under the residuary clause thereof. This
letter said nothing about any agreement between decedent and the Plaintiff, As a matter of fact, the reference
to Plaintiff therein is in complete harmony with the
terms of her vVill as it then existed to the effect it
was "my intent that 1ny nephew, J. \Vill R.andall, receiv•_•
under my will a sufficient number of shares of State
Bank stock to give him, together with the shares already
owned hy him, a margin of control." (Tr. 82, 83)
The witness further testified:

"Q. She said nothing about what her future
intent might be, at any time in the future, but
only that that was her intent so far as her present intent and thinking was concerned, isn't that
right~

"A. I don't know that she ever projected
herself into the future as to what she might want
to do.

"Q. As far as you personally were concerned, you knew that a person legally could
change their will at .any time they so desired~
"A. Yes.
"Q. She indicated at that time that she
wanted to know that Will would get the control
if she died. That is right, isn't it~
"A.

That is right."

The foregoing testimony of l\fr. Sandgren, if considered admissab1P, and Mr. Money and l\fr. Dickson
would indicate that any agreernent between decedent and
Plaintiff related only to the hank stock and then only
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as an inducement to get Plaintiff to come into the
bank and manage the same, for which service Plaintiff
was otherwise sufficiently compensated by s.alary.
The only significant statement the witness, !frs.
•J. A. Zenger Inade was that when she commented to
the decedent that the latter was fortunate to have such
attentive niece and nephew-in-law, decedent stated "th.at
she felt she had it coming to her because the Randalls
were going to be taken care of." This state1nent, contrary to showing any agreen1ent between decedent and
plaintiff, would indicate that no agreement existed; that
plaintiff was going to be provided for by \Vill-not
because of any legal obligation on the part of decedent
but because decedent at that time desired her nephew
to be the recipient of her bounty. As will hereinafter
be demonstrated, plaintiff did receive considerable financial assistance from decedent during her life time and
was to receive considerable frmn her under the terms
of her Will.
l\[r. William W. Brereton, great-nephew of decedent
and husband of the witness, :.Jlildred Brereton, testified
on direct examination by leading and suggestive questions on the part of plaintiff's counsel that,
•• A. I can't recall the exact date or the year,
but she mentioned on more than one occasion
that Will was supposed to get her bank stock
and her home.
"Q. Did she characterize it as an agree1nent,
or a deal?
"A.
Will.

It was an agreement between her and
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"Q.

What was Will to do in exchange for

it?
"A. He was to come down and take care
of her and her business or her affairs.

"Q. And her, is that
"A.

right~

And her.

'"Q. Did she say what he was supposed to
do in taking care of her~
"A. Supposed to take care of the house and
grounds ; the furnace and the home, and take
care of her business." (Tr. 60, 61)
However, on cross exmnination this same witness
admitted that previously in his deposition he had testified differently, as follo·ws,
"Well, she told me more than once that Will
was to get what she had. Now what it was, I
don't know for sure. It might have been everything, but I imagine that was it, because when
she said he was to get it all, what would you
say? . . . .

"Q. And that is as you remember what she
said, is that right?
"A.

(Witness nods head.)" (Tr. 63)

He further admitted on cross examination that at
the time of the taking of his deposition he had stated
that decedent had told hiln "\Viii was to get her estate
and that Will was to "take care of the bank and her
business"; that that was all he remen1bered of the conversation. (Tr. 64)
It is significant that Jvir. Brereton was not present
during testimony of his wife and the plaintiff at the
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time of taking the depositions, while he \vas present
during the giving of the testirrwny by his wife at the
trial. (Tr. 65) In trying to explain why he did not mention taking care of the home .at the deposition the witness said that speaking of taking care of the bank and
decedent's business he thought, would include the home.
(Tr. 65) IIe also stated that he had been a director in
the bank and had worked closely with plaintiff for
sever.al years ; that he had talked to plaintiff several
tirnes about this case, particularly one occasion prior
to the death of ~1rs. Brereton when he knew that something wasn't just right. (Tr. 66)
\Ve submit that :J[r. Brereton's testimony is so
vague, uncertain, and contradictory that it is worthy of
no consideration. I-Ie testified on one occasion that plaintiff w.as to get everything decedent had and then on
another occasion that he was to get the bank and home .
.He testified further that plaintiff was only to take care
of decedent's bank and business and on another occasion,
bank, business and hmne.
Such testinwy, .and indeed all of the te0tin1ony in
this case, falls far short of the require1uent laid down
by this Court and other courts to the effect that before
a party ean obtain specifir perfor1uanre of a parole
agreen1ent to ronvey land the agreen1ent. and each .and
every tenn thereof, n1ust be proved by clear, convincing
and unequivcal Pvidenre.
In the case of PricP r. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86 P. 7GI.
the court "·as confronted with a clailn on the part of
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the Plaintiff that she was a niece of the decedent and
had married his son; that decedent promised Plaintiff
to give her the real property, which she occupied during
the latter part of the deceased lifetime, in consideration
that Plaintiff would "continue to attend to his wants
and .assist him." The Lower Court found in favor of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendant. Ilowever, on appeal
the judgment of the lower court was reversed, the
Supreme Court stating among other things that
"the contract must also be complete and certain
in its terms; and that 'this element of completeness must exist in every contract which can be
specifically e~forced, whatever be its external
form, whether written or verbal, whether embodied in memorandum required by the statute
of frauds, or render obligatory by p.art performance, or by any other act which may obviate
the prohibition of that statute.' Pomeroy, Section
145."
This doctrine was later re-affirmed in the case of
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, where
the Court held
"In Price v. Lloyd, 31 Ut., 86, 86 P. 767, 8
I.R.A. (N.S.) 870, which was an action for the
specific performance of a parol agreement or gift
of land, the court held that the contract must be
complete and certain in its terms. In spport of
this proposition the court, at page 97 of 31 Utah,
at page 770 of 86 P. quotes with approval the
following excerpt from Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts (2d Ed.) Sec. 145.
" .... In the beginning of the section referred
to the same author says :
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'It is elementary doctrine of the courts
of equity that they will not specifically
enforce any contract unless it is complete
and certain.'
"The following authorities cited by appellant
are to the same effect: Beall et al. v. Clark, 71
Ga. 818; Allen v. Webb, 64 Ill. 342; Rogers Locomotive & Mach. Works v. Helm, 154 U.S. 610,
14 Sup. Ct. 1177, 22 L. Ed. 562; Pike v. Pettus,
71 Ala. 98; Langston v. Bates, 84 Ill. 542, 25 Am.
Rep. 466; 13 C. J. 263. See also, Quinn v. Daly,
300 Ill. 273, 133 N.E. 290, in which it is said:
'A contract will not be enforced unless
the terms are clear, certain and unambiguous.'
"-and :Marti v. Ludeking (Iowa) 185 N.W. 476,
wherein the court says :
'Contracts to be specifically enforced must
be so certain and definite in their terms
as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be
supplied by the court, and they must be
mutual.'
"See, also, Albia Light & Railway Co. v. Gold
Goose Coal & :h1ining Co. (Iowa) 185 N.,Y. 571.
"In C. J. supra, it is said:
'In order that there may be an agreement, the parties must haYe a distinct
intention comn1on to both and w·ithout
doubt or difference. Until all understand
alike, there can be no a·ssent, and therefore no contract. Both parties 1nust assent
to the same thing in the smne sense, and
their 1ninds 1nust 1neet as to all the tenus."'
Not only 1nust the ter1ns of the contract be complete
.and certain but also such ter1ns 11m:_;;t be proved by clear

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and convincing evidence. See Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah
290, 279 P. 502; Clark v. George 120 Utah 350, 234 P.
2d. 8-±-!.
In the latter case the Court reviewed prior cases
decided on this point and held:
"This court has repeatedly insisted upon the
necessity of definiteness in the provisions of oral
contracts for the conveyance of .land in consideration for care and attention by a member of the
family of the promiser. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah
86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.N.S., 870; Montgomery v.
Berrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569; Van Natta v.
Heywood, 57 Utah 367, 195 P. 192; Clark v. Clark,
74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502. In this case, the Plaintiff's
evidence is that the little house was to be theirs,
whether by deed or by will or in what fashion
or at what time is not mentioned. The defendant
denies ever writing the letter to the Plaintiff,
offering to give them the little house and testified that he permitted them to move into it because they had no place to live . . . . we do not
disagree with the trial court's findings: 'The
court specifically finds that there never has at
any time been any contract between the plaintiff
and the defendants, or either of them, nor with
Margaret Ann George during her lifetime, for
the conveyance of real estate herein before
described, or any part thereof, or any of the
improvements thereon, and all the allegations of
plaintiff's complaint to the effect that there were
contracts for the conveyance of said property
to be untrue, because of the insufficiency of the
evidence' . . . . The rule is stated in Clark v.
Clark, supra, that the plaintiff, in declaring specific performance of an oral contract must establish
the terms thereof with a greater degree of certainty than is required in an action at law, and
23
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he must show a clear mutual understanding and
a positive agreement of both parties to the terms
of the contract.'" (Italics added)
A very good annotation on the subject of compelling specific performance of an oral contract to convey real property is found in 69 A.L.R. Pages 14 to
214, in connection with the case of Andreu:s v. Aiken,
44 Idaho 797, 260 P. 423. Pages 48 to 57 of this annotation deals with the requisite as to certainty of the
terms of the contract. As stated therein:
" .... a court of equity is never anxious to gr.asp
at slight circumstances to rescue it from the
operation of the statute, nor does it indulge in
any latitude of construction if there is any equivocation or uncertainty in the case presented. It
adopts the rule that the contract should be clear
and definite, and that the acts done should be
equally clear and definite and solely with a view
to the performance of the particular agreement.
If the language employed leaves the intention of
the parties who executed the contract in doubt,
or if there is uncertainty in regard to what 'Yas
intended, a court of equity will not undertake to
decree a specific performance. The minds of the
parties must meet. The testator must understand
that he is not merely promising to do something
in the future, but is doing it now; that he is
relinquishing his righ-t to change his mind. The
parties must express the1nselves in such terms
that their intention can be ascertained to .a
reasonable degree of certainty; and, if the agreement is so vague and indefinite that it is not
possible to collect the full intention of the parties,
it is not enforceable in equity. Neither the court
nor the jury can make an .agreement for the
parties." (Italics added)
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See also, a supple1nental annotation in 106 A.L.R.
742.
Certainly the testimony delineated above does not
establish by the clear, convincing, and unequivoc.al standards the specific tern1s of any contract. Was the Plaintiff to receive the bank stock and home of decedent or was
he to receive all of her property? Did decedent understand that she was not merely promising to do something in the future but that she w.as promising specifically
to do something now, relinquishing her right subsequently to change her mind if she so desired? Was the
Plaintiff n1oving from Ogden to Provo to take a job in
the bank for his own financial and pecuniary benefit
or for the financial and pecuniary benefit of decedent~
There is no testimony at all in this c.ase that Plaintiff
was obligated by any agreement to provide the filial
service, affection, companionship, and society which is
necessary to invoke the power of a court in equity to
compel specific performance.
Assume, however, for the n1oment that there is
evidence that a contract existed requiring the Plaintiff
to take c.are of Plaintiff's personal and financial affairs.
There is no evidence in the record which would support
a finding that Plaintiff did in fact take care of such
personal and financial affairs. Reference was made by
Mrs. Mildred Brereton that decedent stated she wanted
someone to handle her affairs in the lumber business.
( Tr. 16, 22, 30) There is no testimony in this record
that Plaintiff did anything to assist decedent in this
matter. The evidence, likewise, shows that decedent had
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other financial interests, but nothing the Plaintiff did
would indicate a 1nanagement of these affairs for decedent.
It is true there is testimony that Plaintiff ,and members of his family gave attention to the decedent by
furnishing her meals, caring for her lawn and grounds,
and showing her personal attention. There was no claim
that these acts constituted the basis of the agreement.
Nor could the Plaintiff prove an agreement between
hin1 and decedent by showing certain acts on his part.
Such evidence is wholly self-serving insofar ,as showing
an;~ agreeinent betweent the parties and is admissable
only to show· perforn1ance on his part in the event the
specific tern1s of the alleged contract are otherwise
proved hy clear, convincing and unequivocal testimony.
The fact is, the evidence shows that Plaintiff and decedent
were on close personal tenns before 1946, as well as after,
and that Plaintiff's wife did decedent's washing and decedent consulted Plaintiff on financial n1atters. (Tr. 21,
29)
The above acb are entirely consistent with the
view that l\Ir. Randall hoped to 1naintain the good
graces of his relativ-e to the end that she would leaYe
him sorne or all of her property on her death, that he
devoted some tiine and attention to her personal wants
in order to influence her in rnaking him the principal
beneficiary under her Will. There appears to be no
doubt that 1\Irs. Brereton knew she was bestowing most
of her property upon l\ir. Randall during a considerable
period between the tirne of the death of her husband and
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her own death. But by the smne token the evidence
demonstrates clearly that she understood she had the
right to change her Will at any tirne she desired, which
she did. It is very significant that the testimony shows
that Plaintiff w.as apparently aware of the changed
attitude on the part of decedent sorne tirne before her
death because he discussed it with the witness, Will
Brereton. (Tr. 67)
It is Appellant's further contention that before a
purported or.al agreement n1ay be specifically enforced,
the law requires that the agreement relate to services
which are of such a peculiar character that is it impossible to estirnate their value by .any pecuniary standard.
In the very early Ut.ah case of Brinton v. Van Cott,
8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218, the Court set out one of,the important criteria in determining whether an agreement to will
or leave a party property will be enforced, as follows :
"When the consideration of the agreement
consists in work, labor, and services personally
done and rendered by the Plaintiff, if the value
of the same can be ascertained with reasonable
accuracy in an action at law, and adequately compensated by the recovery of damages, then neither
the services t-hlemselves nor the payment for
them will avail as a part performance of the
verbal agreement. But if the services are of such
a peculiar character that it is impossible to estimate their value by .any pecuiary standard, and it
is evident that the parties did not intend to measure them by such standard, then the Plaintiff,
after the performance of these services could not
be restored to the situation in which he was
before, or be compensated by any recovery of
legal damages." (Italics added)·
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In Olsen v. Dixon, 165 Minn. 124, 205 N.W. 955,
the rule is stated thusly:
"A contract [to devise one's estate] cannot
be enforced specifically unless the assumption by
the promisee of the relations of a personal and
domestic nature is one of the elements of the
contract. If the services to be performed are not
those which the promisor may procure from a
hired servant, and if they consist, in whole or
in part, of giving to the promisor the companionship and personal attention which are common
among members of a family living together in
one household, and which are incapable of measurement by pecuniary standards, specific performance of the contract may be decreed. But,
if the services might have been rendered by a
stranger as satisfactorily as by the promisee, and
the relations of the parties are not of a peculiarly
personal or domestic nature, the promisee has
a claim against the promisor for the reasonable
value of the services, and nothing more."
In the case Ehling v. Diebert (N.J.) 15 Atl. 2d 655,
the Plaintiff did not live with the decedent, but worked
in her butcher shop. He claimed that deceased promised
hi1n that if he would take c.are of her affairs she would
leave him everything upon her death. Testin1ony was
given that he becmne her constant companion, took her
for rides and spent all his tin1e with her, helped her
with household duties, and collected rents for her. Plaintiff testified that after he 1narried he spent so much tune
with deceased that it ahnost broke up his 1narriage. The
Court deter1nined that deceased had paid the Plaintiff
a salary for his work, and that the personal attention
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given to decedent was not such as to require specific
performance of the contract.
The c.ase of Andrews vs. Aiken, 44 Idaho 797, 260
P. 423, 69 A.L.R. 14, is likewise illustrative of a situation in which the claimant performs work of a busines~
or household nature not involving such companionship
and filial responsibility that such services cannot be
compensated for in money. The duties of Aiken were
to rent property, collect rents, pay taxes, make settlements with tenants, pay over profits to decedent, and
other incidental managerial activities. In reviewing the
cases involved with the problem of enforcing purported
agreements of the kind presented in the instant case,
the court held :
"In practically all the cases where specific
performance was decreed, the contracts called
for the performance of duties of a filial and intiInate personal nature, the value of which could
not be estimated. This, of course, presents an
entirely different question, and such .authorities
are not in point in this case. IIere the deceased
or promisor was not to live in the family of
the respondent, and no close, intimate, or filial
relationship was to exist. The contract simply
required respondent to look after the business of
the deceased. He was to handle the farms and
various properties, receive .and disburse moneys,
and in general act as the business advisor and
assistant of the owner. He was required to render
no service that an ordinary real estate agent or
factor could not and does not perform for his
clients. This was not a contract for the personal
care of an aged person where great patience with
his infirmities was required, contemplating not
only food, medicine, and clothing, but good tern29
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per, forbearance, and honest effort to please, and
an intimate family relationship; but was simply
a business arrangement for the management and
care of the property of the deceased."
To the smne effect are the authorities cited in the
annotation in G9 A.L.R. connnencing at page 145.
It is also significant that the decedent had housekeepers and cmnpanions who stayed wjth her in the
hmne, provided for her personal needs, and gave her
association and cmnpanionship fron1 day to day.
The testin1ony of :Jirs. :Jiildred Brereton concerning
this matter, after she left the home of decedent, is as
follows:
"Q. At the tin1e you left her, did she have
anyone there to look after or help her take care
of her~
"A.

I think l\Irs. Celventra was there.

"Q. Following that tune and up until 1946,
did she have ladies, from tin1e to time, who lived
with her on a friendly basis and helped her in
·the home~
"A. She had people that would come in. :Mr.
and Mrs. Sorensen were there for awhile. They
1noved up frmu southern Utah. I don't remember
exactly when. I re1nember when she told us they
were cmuing and they lived there and took care
of the house and furnished the groceries and she
was giving the1n rent free.

"Q.
go

Over what period of ti1ne was this to

on~

"A.

About two years.
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"Q.

Do you know what years it was 1

•'A.

I think probably from 1944 to 1946.

"Q. Do you know whether there was anyone
there st.aying with her in the Fall of 1946 when
Will Randall came down J
"A.

They were still there, I think.

"Q.

They were still there at that

time~

"A. During the time he first came down to
the bank, they were there.

"Q. Following that time that he moved
down, in the Fall of 1946, came down to work in
the bank, until 1950, until her illness in 1950, did
she have anybody live with her at the time 1
"A.

Off and on she did, I think.

"Q. And the people that lived with h~n
were there day after day while they were living
there, and stayed there at night, didn't they~
'A. No, she had a lady that just stayed at
night, for awhile.

"Q. But she also had some people that
stayed during that time or part of the time,
didn't she '?
"A. I couldn't tell you exactly when she
started having them stay in the daytime.
"Q. Do you recall any more specifically
as to what the Randalls did, than what these
other people did for her during this period, Mrs.
Brereton~

"A. Even when the ladies were there, they
never did the wash or ironing.

"Q. But they were there and stayed there
and looked after her in the daytime or the nighttime, isn't that right~
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"A.

They did take care of her.

"Q. Since 1950 she has had someone there
all the time, both day and night, hasn't she?

"A. I think so.

"Q.

Up until the time she died?

"A. Yes."
It must be ren1embered that although Plaintiff assisted in finding such companions for decedent they were
all paid by decedent and not by Plaintiff. And the fact
that none of these people who personally attended decedent were ever called .as witnesses demonstrates forcefully that :Jirs. Brereton had never discussed any agreement with thein. Surely, the existence of a specific, unequivocal contract would have been communicated to one
or more of these close companions - if in fact such an
agreement existed.
The slight innuendoes relied on by Plaintiff that
decedent ren1arked on occasions that she had something
coming from Will Randall, or that he owed it to her, or
that it was \Vill's job, or that he would be taken care
of, have less probative value than does the failure of
the decedent to 1nention any purported agree1nent to her
various attendants.
We therefore, respectfully
.
. subn1it that the evidence
1s insufficient to sustain the burden required of the
Plaintiff to prove that a specific agreen1ent was entered
into and that Plaintiff performed the conditions thereof
required of him.
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POINT II
THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE REQUIRE THE
FINDING THAT ANY SUCH PURPORTED AGREEMENT
WAS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND UNENFORCEABLE.

Section 25-5-3 U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or s.ale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
The contract here claimed by the Plaintiff was to
the effect that decedent would leave him certain real
property and bank stock. The fact that the .alleged contract in this case involved not only real property, but
personal property, does not take it out of the Statute
of Frauds relating to real property. The law on this
point is well settled as set forth in 49 A1n. Jur., Statute
of Frauds, Sec. 216 as follows:
"Where the agremnent is to devise and
bequeath both real and personal property and the
consideration therefor, is entire, as for exmnple
as entire in its nature, and if oral, the whole
fails, even though the part relating to the personalty if standing alone would not have been
invalidated by the statute. The rule applies not
only to oral contracts to devise and bequeath
both realty and personalty, but to agreements by
which the promisor in general terms leaves all
of his property to the promisee, and the promisor
dies leaving both real and personal property:
such an agreement is deemed to be one for a
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transfer of an interest in land although the promisor may not have owned any real property at
the time the agreement was made."
See also: Grady 'L Faison, 224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E. 2d
760; Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 46 S.E. 2d 561;
15 A.L.R. 2d 1325.
The fact that the contract here alleged is within
the Statute of Frauds gives rise to the principle of
law heretofore enunciated by this court as to the requireInents that the contract must be complete and certain
in its tern1s and n1ust be established by clear, convincing
and unequivocal evidence. See, Clark r. George, supra.
As heretofore pointed out, the court will never
enforce a parole contract to convey property in consideration of personal services ( assun1ing for the purpose of this argument that there was sufficient evidence
of such an Agreement here) where the services are
1neasureable in value in monetary terms. See, Brinton
r. Van Cott, supra; Andreu·s v. Aiken, supra. In all of
the cases where the court has enforced the agreement
the party claiining the benefits of the parole contract
lived with the decedent and was a constant and close
companion. In the instant case Plaintiff was neither.
He lived in his own hon1e with his wife and family and
visited his Aunt when he desired so to do or when asked
to do so hy decedent.
This Con rt ha~ had occasion to pass upon the question of whether services of the kind rendered by Plaintiff and his fa1nily for decedent are capable of being
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valued in 1noney. In the case of Startin v. Madsen (1951)
120 Utah 631, 237 P 2d 834, the Plaintiff was seeking
to recover the reasonable value of service performed
for decedent. A judgn1ent in favor of the Plaintiff was
affirmed on appeal by the Supren1e Court which sunlmarized the facts as follows:
"James Madsen, brother of plaintiff and
defendant, died at 88, having been bedridden and
in need of close personal care for the previous
six years. His aged wife, Priscilla, was able to
do some household tasks the fore part of this
period, but was in need of some care and assistance herself, particularly during the last two
years when her memory cmnpletely failed her.
Plaintiff lived about two blocks away. Her husband also was very ill during part of this time,
and although she had to divide her attention
between her own home and that of the ~Iadsens,
she nevertheless prepared 1neals for the ~1adsens,
first at their home, and later for several years
at her own home, carrying thein the two blocks
three times daily. Assisted somewhat by her
daughter and daughter-in-law, she prepared these
meals, bought provisions, cleaned the Madsen
home, washed their clothes and linens, bathed Mr.
Madsen, changed his bedding, gave him medicine
when needed, and otherwise provided comfort and
necessaries principally to Mr. Madsen and partially to Mrs. Madsen. Her services became increasingly burdensome as the Madsens grew
older. Plaintiff's other brother, defendant herein,
and his son also assisted the ~Iadsens some."
The above services were ren<1ered over a period of
six years (approxiinately 2,190 days). The court, after
quoting from 58 A1n. J ur. 'Vork .and Labor, Section 63,
to the effect that a jury n1ay detennine the reasonable
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value of labor perforn1ed upon request without a specific
contract therefor, even though there is no evidence of
the value of such labor, went on to say:
"This rule would apply to the type of work
the plaintiff did. The term "practical nurse" is
just another name for ordinary housekeeping and
the personal care and attention which everyone
gives to sick people in their own homes; that
is, to prepare the meals, feed, bathe, clothe,
change their clothing and their bedding and
attend to their needs. There is nothing particularly technical nor pofessional .about it. Every
person of ordinary intelligence and understanding
knows what that work consists of and has some
idea to its value."
In another case, Burton v. McLaughlin, (1950) 117
Utah 483, 217 Pac 2d 566, this Court .affirn1ed an award
against the Estate of Patrick Henry ~fcLaughlin for
services rendered including cooking, mending, housekeeping, running errands, and looking after the personal
needs of decedent when he was sick.
See, also, H ols.z L'. Stephen, 362 Ill. 527, 200 N .E.
601, 106 A.L.R. 737. There the Illinois Supreme Court
announced the rule to be :
"Even where the tenus of the contract are
clear, certain, and unan1biguous, specific performance is not a n1atter of right, but rests in the
sound discretion of the court to be determined
frmn all the facts and circu1nstances. Edwards
v. Brown, 308 Ill. 350, 139 N.E. 618. The re1nedy
is afforded where the contract has been performed by one party in such a way that the
parties c.annot be placed in. statu quo or da1nages
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awarded which would be full compensation. vVeir
v. Weir, 287 Ill. 495, 122 N.E. 868; Koenig v.
Dohm, 209 Ill. 468, 70 N.E. 1061. The performance relied upon must place the party who has
performed in such a situation that it would be
a fraud upon him if the agreement were not carried out. Nelson v. Nelson, 334 Ill. 43, 165 N.E.
159. To take an or.al promise which has been
partly performed out of the statute, part performance must be such that a restoration of their
previous condition is impracticable and a refusal
to go on and complete the engagement would be
a virtu.al fraud upon the parties. Shraver v.
Wickwire, 335 Ill. 46, 166 N.E. 458; Stephens
v. Collison, 313 Ill. 365, 145 N.E. 81. The performance of personal services, the value of which may
be estimated in money, or for which a recovery
may be had at law, will not take the contract
out of the statute, because the law affords .an
adequate remedy.
The evidence in this case would dearly dmnonstrate
that the services rendered by ~Ir. J. vYill Randall, the
Plaintiff, as well as by me1nbers of his family, could be,
and were during her life time compens.ated for by decedent in money or property.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN RULINGS ON THE
EVIDENCE.

It was and is Appellant's position in this case that
Plaintiff cmne to Provo to ·work in the bank because
such change of position iminediately increased his
income, and that over the years Plaintiff w.as adequately
paid and cmnpensated for any services which he 1nay
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have rendered to the decedent. In the first place, although
Respondent claims he g.ave up his business in Ogden
and moved to Provo as a p.art of a purported agreement between Plaintiff and decedent, the evidence shows
that he did not give up any business but continued to
own the smne interest in the Pioneer Coal and Lumber
Company at Ogden and still n1aintains his position as
President. (Tr. 69)
On cross exmnination counsel atten1pted to interrogate the witness I~ay Randall with respect to the
salary and incon1e his father received in Ogden as cOinpared to the salar~· and income he received on accepting
a position with the State B.ank of Provo. Although counsel explained Appellant's position to the Court, the
Court refused to allow any testimony on the matter.
( Tr. 96, 97). Certainly such evidence was admissable
to negative the clailn of Plaintiff that he went to Provo
because of an .alleged agreetnent when the change in
financial position 1nay well have been such as to have
explained the reason for his move.
The Court did allow testilnony to the effect that
during the years, both before and after Plaintiff left
Ogden and r.a1ne to Provo, decedent gave hun various
ite1ns of property. including 1200 shares of lTtah Ti1nber
nnd Coal C01npany stock, real property located in Los
Angeles of a Yalue of between $1,500 and $2,000, and
20 shares of stock in the State Bank of Provo. (Tr. 98,
99). The value of the foregoing property· is indicated
by the prob.ate file in the Matter of the Estate of
Sarah P. Randall Brereton, Deceased, (Probate No.
38
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10915) which was introduced in evidence at the trial.

The Inventory and Apprais1nent shows the lJtah Timber
and Coal Con1pany stock to be of the approximate v.alue
of $8,400.00, and the 20 shares of stock in the State
Bank of Provo to be of the approximate value of
$6,440.00, making in excess of $16,340.00 received by
Plaintiff from decedent.
In addition to the property which decedent gave
to Plaintiff, l(ay Randall testified that she had given
him $100 on one occasion and 200 shares of Timber
and Coal stock on another occasion.
If the court had permitted counsel to inquire into
the salary received by Mr. Randall upon his coming to
Provo and thereafter, the evidence would have demonstrated clearly the reason behind the move, as well as
the reason behind the attentions paid by Plaintiff to
decedent. Such evidence also explains why Mrs. Brereton
on occasion may have stated that, "She had it coming,"
or that "Will owed it to her," or such other similar
comments.
Claim is also made by Appellant that the trial
court improperly admitted the testimony of Clyde Sandgren, an attorney-at-law, who testified concerning certain
conversations he had with the decedent.
On Voir Dire examination prior to giving testimony
of the conversations, ~lr. Sandgren testified as follows:

"Q. And your conversation with ~irs. Brereton, on this occasion as well as on other occasions,
was in a matter of business, wasn't it 1
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"A. Yes.

"Q. She owned
the bank and she was
your legal advice in
done relative to this

the controlling interest in
the one that was obtaining
respect to what should be
stock, isn't that correct~

"A. Yes, she sought my advice with respect
to it. (Tr. 72, 73)

"Q. Your occasion for being over at her
home was that she called you over there to discuss this matter you were working on for the
bank, is that not right~
"A. Well, it was to discuss with me the
disposition of her stock in the bank, that's right.

"Q. She called you over for the purpose, to
discuss with you the disposition of her stock
in the bank~
"A.

Broadly speaking, that would be true.

"Q. And you recognize her at that time as
being the president and the one who held the
controlling interest in the bank~
"A. Yes, I knew she was president and that
she held controlling interest.

"Q. And you were aware, in her discussion
with you, that she wanted to seek your advice
and to have your advice here with reference to
her stock in the bank¥
"A. Yes, I think I would have to say yes
to that. (Tr. 76)
"Q. Didn't the nature of vour work with
Mrs. Brereton relate to her di~position of her
stock in the bank?
"A.

Yes.
40
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"Q. From the very first time you saw her,
including .all the transactions you had with her 1
"A.

Yes.

"Q. And in connection with that very first
conversation, you realized she was discussing
this matter with you in terms of obtaining your
advice and counsel as an attorney~
"A.
tion 1

vVould you mind repeating the ques(Last question read.)

"A. Yes.

"Q. And you realized that, in her c.alling
you over there, that she was seeking to get your
professional advice 1
"A.

Yes. (Tr. 77, 78)

"Q. But you never told her you were not
going to bill her for these other services, did
you~

"A.

No.

"Q. You never told her you weren't going
to represent her in connection with these other
matters she had talked to you about~
"A.

No." (Tr. 79)

Our Statute, Section 78-24-8 (2), U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"An attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
therein, in the course of professional employment."
The case of City and County of San Francisco v.
Fhtperior Co1trt, 31 Cal. 2d 227, 231 Pac. 2d 26, 25 A.L.R.
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2d 1418, discusses the privileges of the attorney-client
relationship and states the grounds therefore as follows:
"The privilege is given on grounds of public
policy in the belief that the benefits derived therefrom justify the risk that unjust decisions may
sometimes result from the suppression of relevant
evidence. Adequate legal representation in the
.ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
prosecution or defense of litigation compels a full
disclosure of the facts by the client to his attorney. 'Unless he makes known to the lawyer all
the facts, the advice which follows will be useless, if not misleading; the lawsuit will be conducted along improper lines, the trial will be full
of suprises, much useless litigation may result.
Thirdly, unless the client knows that his lawyer
cannot be compelled to reveal what is told him,
the client will suppress what he thinks to be
unfavorable facts.' Morgan, Foreword, Am. Law.
Inst. Code of Evidence, pp. 25-26. Given the
privilege, a client may make such a disclosure
without fear that his attorney 1nay be forced to
reveal the information confided to him. 'The
absence of the privilege would convert the attorney habitually and inevitably into a mere inforIner for the benefit of the opponent.' 8 Wign1ore
supra, Sec. 2380a, p. 813."
This same view was upheld by this Court in the
case of Burton v. JJ,fcLaughlin, supra. See, also, :Mangan's
vVill, 185 Wis. 328, 200 N.W. 386; Collins v. Collins, 110
Ohio St. 105, 143 N.E. 561; In Re Bayer, 116 Neb. 670,
218 N.W. 746.
According to the testhnony of l\1r. Sangren all of
the convers.ations he had ·with decedent were in con-
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nection with her seeking legal advice frmn hiin as to
the disposition of her property by Will. We therefore
sub1nit that his testi1nony as to such conversations was
unad1nissible. This would not make unadmissible the
letter (Exhibit . A.) sent to Tracy-Collins Trust Company
which letter on its face indicates that Mrs. Brereton at
that tilne desired to leave to the Plaintiff a sufficient
amount of stock to give him control of the bank and
asked ~Ir. Newell B. Dayton, Vice-President of TracyCollins Trust Company if her Will so provided. If Mrs.
Brereton had previously made an agreement to leave
Plaintiff such bank stock (and had performed such .agreement by making a third codicil to her Will in the spring
of 1946), there was certainly no reason for her to write
Exhibit A.
The trial court by its ruling as well as its com1nents
(Tr. 74, 75), and also the jury, apparently gave considerable weight to the testimony of l\Ir. Sandgren as
to his conversations with decedent which were inadmissible.
POINT IV·
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE MATTER
TO THE JURY AND IN FOLLOWING ITS DETERMINATION
OF THE FACTS.

It is Appellant's position in respect to this point
first that the court should not have tried the 1natter
to a jury. Defendant made a motion to strike the cause
from the jury calendar for the reason that the matter
was not one in connection with which the Plaintiff had
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a right to trial by jury and the court would be in a
much better position to determine the facts than a jury
which was denied. (R. 9)
Counsel is of the opinion that the trial court desired
to avoid determining the sufficiency of the facts and
for that reason placed the responsibility upon the jury
well knowing that the evidence, such as it may be, would
be uncontradicted because there would be no one available to testify contrary to 'vhat might be testified to by
Plaintiff's witnesses. The very nature of a case such
as the one now before the court is such that dispute in
the evidence is rarely possible. Persons having contact
with the decedent may testify with respect to conversations which they purportedly had, but neither the decedent nor any third person can come in and dispute the fact
that such conversations took place. Thus, the only purpose served by having a jury would be to see if the nature
of the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff would be such
as to influence the jurors to recognize Plaintiff's claim.
Obviously after the jury has returned its verdict, the
court is in a strong position to find in favor of the
Plaintiff notwithstandmg the legal insufficiency of the
evidence. By such a method little effect, if any at all,
is given to the rule of law requiring the clain1ant to
prove by clear, convincing and unequivocal testiinony,
not only that an agreement was 1nade but the specific
terms thereof.
Responsibility of the trial court in this case fairly
and impartially to hear and determine the n1atter could
not be delegated to a jury in order to give additional
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'veight or support to the claims of the Plaintiff by a
SYJ.npathetic verdict in Plaintiff's favor.
Appellant further contends that the case should not
have been submitted to the jury because the evidence
was insufficient. Counsel made appropriate requests for
a directed verdict but the same were denied. (R. 24,
25). If, however, this court should find that there was
some evidence to go to the jury, then the trial court
should have submitted it to them upon proper instructions.
Although counsel requested the court to instruct the
jury that the burden was upon the Plaintiff to prove
the specific terms of the contract by "clear, convincing
and unequivocal testimony" the court refused so to do,
stating merely in Instruction No. 2 that the proof should
be "clear and convincing." (R. 15) As originally drafted,
this instruction used the phrase "clear, positive and
unequivocal"; but the court changed its mind about the
matter before submitting it to the jury and instructed
then1 .as above indicated. (R. 15) Likewise, the court
instructed the jury in Instruction No. 2, that it was
necessary to find that the terms of the contract were
"substantially" as set forth. (R. 15) Exception was taken
to this instruction by the Defendant, (Tr. 144) and
apparently some time since the case was decided someone has drawn a line through the word "substantially"
in the instruction. (R. 15)
In view of the repeated declarations by this Court
of the quantum and quality of proof necessary to esta45
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blish an oral agreement to convey real property by a
decedent, we submit that the foregoing instructions not
only misled the jury but likewise the trial court in
reaching its decision.
Defendant further requested the court to instruct the
jury that the law "jealously guards and protects the
right of an individual to dispose of his or her property
after her death as such person may desire, and it is
riot for you or the Court to pass judgment upon the
decedent in this case as to whether she has wisely or
equitably disposed of her property by her last Codicil
to her \Viii and Testament. How you or I may have
disposed of our property under circumstances of this
case is entirely immaterial.
You may, however, consider the terms and conditions
of her Will and the various codicils thereto, in determining whether or not decedent had entered into a contract
with Plaintiff as claimed by him." (R. 30) Again we
submit that this instruction was proper and the subject
matter thereof should have been taken into consideration
by both the court and jury in arriving at any decision
in this case.
The effect of the court's instructions was to impress
the jury that if there· was any evidence to support a
finding in favor of Plaintiff they should do so. The
Court apparently adopted this same theory in reaching
its decision after the jury's verdict was returned. For
instance, Instruction No. 3, excepted to by Defendant,
Tr. 114), .advises the jury that an oral agreement "is
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as binding upon the parties as a written agreement
when such agreement has been established to the extent
that it is required by the law," without at that time
advising the jury as to the burden which the Plaintiff
had to establish such contract and further without giving
the jury the benefit of Defendant's Requested Instructions Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8.
It appears to Appellant that the trial court did not
follow the law, either in its instructions to the jury or
in considering the matter subsequent to the verdict.

CONCLUSION
By way of summary Appellant respectfully urges:
1. The Plaintiff failed to allege .and prove by clear,
convincing, and unequivocal evidence that any contract
as claimed existed between him and the decedent.

2. The evidence is insufficient to show that Plaintiff performed any contract justifying the court in
ordering specific perfor1nance.
3. The evidence shows that any service perfonned
by the Plaintiff were, or could .be, compensated for in
1noney so that specific performance in aily event should
be denied.
4. The court erred in its ruling on the evidence,
which if properly determined, would have required a
verdict for the Defendant in this matter.
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5. The court erred in submitting the matter to
the jury and in the instructions which it gave upon the
issues.
6. Subsequently, in following the verdict of the
jury and in giving effect to the errors committed in its
instructions, the court ilnproperly entered Judgment for
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
In urging this Court to reverse the trial court, we
desire to adopt the language of the text appearing in
69 A.L.R. at page 167, as follows :
"It has been remarked that contracts of the
character in question have become so frequent in
recent years as to cause alarm, and the courts
have grown conserv.ative as to the nature of the
evidence required to establish them, and as to
enforcing them when established. Also, that cases
of this character are inherently easy to prove and
hard to combat,-a characteristic that should not
impair the .action when proved, but which should
cause the court to proceed with caution. And the
view has been expressed that, when such a contract is 1nade the basis of an action, the evidence
in support of it should be looked upon with great
jealousy, and weighed in the Inost scrupulous
manner. The character, conduct, and testimony
of the witnesses should be as to inspire confidence
th.at they are telling the truth. Such a contract
can be enforced only when it is clearly proved
by direct and positive testiinony and its tern1s
are definite and certain.
"''There a decree for the specific enforcement of a contract to will all of the owner's
property to another will have the result of
rendering ineffectual the prmnisor's will, and pass
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to the promisee the title to all the property left
by him at his decease, subject only to the claims
made thereto by law for the widow, justification
for such judgment can only be found in a contract
fully executed by the promisee, definite and certain in every essential, and made to appear by
clear and convincing proof. If, therefore, the
proof submitted does not bring the case within
the rule requiring execution of the contract, the
p.arties will be left to their redress at law."
Respectfully Submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
WENDELL B. HAMMOND
Bountiful, Utah
GEORGE FADEL
Bountiful, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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